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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the Utah State Medicaid Plan fails to comply with 
federal law and is therefore invalid. 
Even if the Utah State Plan is not invalid per se, whether 
the Hearing Officer's refusal to allow Weber Memorial the 
opportunity to submit evidence of its costs and to prove 
it is an efficiently and ecnomically operated facility was 
contrary to the applicable federal statute and regulations 
and in violation of Appellant's right to a fair hearing. 
Whether the Fearing Officer's and District Court's ruling 
regarding the Department's classification of patients in 
need of "Skilled" care as "Intermediate" patients is arbi-
trary and capricious. 
v 
JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal of a decision of the District Court, 
Third Judicial District, affirming the final decision of the 
Executive Director of the Utah Department of Health. A Memoran-
dum Decision was entered by Judge Fishier on June 3, 1986, and 
was followed by a Final Judgment by Judge Daniels on August 4, 
1986, after Judge Fishier had left the bench. A timely Notice of 
Appeal was filed with the Utah Supreme Court. Because appellant 
had a separate action for declaratory and injunctive relief 
pending before the Federal Court, the record was transferred to 
that Court for review, and has now been returned for purposes of 
this appeal. This case was transferred to this court pursuant to 
Rule 4A, Rules of the Utah Court of Apeals, and is properly 
before the court. 
VI 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Weber Memorial Care Center, Inc. (here-
inafter "Weber Memorial'1), is a provider of long-term health care 
in Ogden, Utah. Chartham Management, Inc. is the management cor-
poration which operates the Weber Memorial Care Center. A number 
of the patients of Weber Memorial qualify for Medicaid assis-
tance, and under the state-administered Medicaid system, Weber 
Memorial is reimbursed by the State Department of Health, Divi-
sion of Health Care Financing, which is the Defendant/Appellee 
herein. As will be developed throughout this brief, it is the 
current reimbursement system which is at the heart of the dispute 
between the parties. 
In 1981 the State of Utah adopted a "flat-rate11 system 
of reimbursing providers. Under this system, all long-term 
health care providers are paid a single rate per patient, per day 
for "intermediate" and "skilled" patients. Regardless of costs, 
the provider is reimbursed according to the flat rate set by the 
Department. If costs exceed the flat rate, the provider operates 
at a deficit, and if costs are lower, the provider operates at a 
profit. 
42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(13)(A), the so-called "Boren Amend-
ment," instructs states participating in the Medicaid program to 
pay health care providers through the use of rates which are 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 1 -
"reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred 
by efficiently and economically operated facilities." These 
facilities operate in a heavily regulated environment, and, as 
the Boren Amendment also directs, the rates must take into 
account the costs associated with compliance with "applicable 
state and federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety 
standards, . . . insur[ing] that individuals eligible for 
assistance have reasonable access (taking into account, geograph-
ical location and reason able travel time), . . •" Id. See, 
also, Hillhaven Corp, v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health, 634 F.Supp. 
1313, 1315 (E.D. Wis. 1986.) 
Weber Memorial was purchased from Weber County in 1981. 
When that purchase occurred, the facility became a privately-held 
asset. With private ownership came burdens not associated with 
public ownership by Weber County. Property taxes now had to be 
paid and additions to the physical plant such as a sprinkler 
system had to be made. In spite of these additional costs, good 
management brought the overall cost down, accomplished by respon-
sible reductions in staff, centralization of support functions 
and economies in purchasing. Despite significant efforts to 
reduce costs, including staff reductions, etc., the costs of 
complying with Medicaid standards of patient care and safety 
exceeded the flat rate. By early 1983 it became apparent that 
costs were not going to be met under the reimbursement system. 
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At all times, Weber Memorial contended, as it still does, that it 
was and is an efficiently and economically operated facility. 
Therefore, Weber Memorial requested a hearing under the rules 
promulgated by the Department, in order to contest the 
application of the rates as well as to challenge the 
classification by the Department of certain patients as 
"intermediate" rather than "skilled," i.e., as patients requiring 
relatively less care rather than increased care. 
Weber Memorial made its request for hearing on July 28, 
1983. Despite protests from Weber Memorial, the Department 
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informed it that it must first participate in an "informal hear-
ing" prior to proceeding further. This informal meeting was held 
on September 20, 1983, with no resolution of the issues resulting 
therefrom. Weber Memorial was not permitted to submit evidence 
at that time. 
After Weber Memorial was informed that it must again 
request a formal hearing, a new request was submitted on October 
7, 1983. Thereafter, a certain amount of discovery took place, 
and the hearing officer set the matter for hearing on November 
21, 1983. The hearing was reset for December 12, 1983, but 
before the hearing could be held, the Department filed a Motion 
for Continuance. The hearing officer granted the Motion, based 
upon the Department's representation that it needed until 
February 14, 1984 to prepare for the hearing. 
On February 10, 1984 the Department, without warning, 
requested that the hearing officer essentially reject Plaintiff's 
appeal without hearing it. The Department took the position, 
which it has maintained throughout these proceedings, that the 
flat rate itself implicitly defines an efficiently and economi-
cally operated facility within the meaning of federal law and 
that it is not necessary to examine any individual facility's 
costs, efficiencies and economies. 
On April 2, 1984 the Department filed a formal motion 
asking the hearing officer to rule as a matter of law and without 
a hearing that the Utah State Medicaid Plan did not violate 
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federal law, and that the Plan did not require an examination of 
Weber Memorial's costs nor a determination as to whether the par-
ticular facility is efficiently and economically operated. On 
June 20, 1984 the hearing officer ruled in favor of the Depart-
ment, holding that the 
Utah state and federal plan for reimbursing 
providers of Medicaid services in Utah does 
not require or contemplate examination of an 
individual facilities (sic) costs and a deter-
mination as to whether or not that particular 
facility is economically and efficiently oper-
ated -- nor does any other provision of state 
and federal law require such an examination. 
(Letter of Hearing Officer, Brian Farr, June 20, 1984). 
The administrative hearing finally commenced on August 
3, 1984, over a year after it was originally requested. Pursuant 
to the hearing officer's ruling, Weber Memorial was never permit-
ted to introduce evidence of its costs or to prove, as it was 
prepared to, that is is an efficiently and economically operated 
facility within the meaning of the federal statute. 
On May 20, 1985, nearly two years after the request 
for hearing was submitted, the hearing officer issued his Propos-
ed Decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Execu-
tive Director adopted the findings on June 4, 1985. Weber 
Memorial appealed the decision to the District Court, which issu-
ed its opinion affirming the hearing officer on June 3, 1986, 
(Memorandum Opinion, J. Fishier), followed by a Final Judgment 
entered August 4, 1986 by Judge Daniels. Thereafter, this appeal 
was filed. Because Weber Memorial had previously filed an action 
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for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Federal Court, the 
record was transferred to that Court. In the meantime, the case 
was transferred to the Court of Appeals. The record having been 
recently returned to this court, the matter is now ready for 
review. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The State of Utah, by participating in the Medicaid 
program, has agreed to abide by all applicable federal statutes 
and regulations. The federal statute and regulations require 
participating states (1) to establish rates which are in fact 
reasonable and adequate to meet the costs of efficiently and 
economically operated health care providers (42 U.S.C. §1396a(a) 
(13)(A)); (2) to make "findings" that the rate is reasonable and 
adequate to meet the standard set forth in § 1396a(a)(13)(A), (42 
C.R.F. §447.252(b)) ; and (3) to provide "assurances" to the 
Secretary of HHS that the rate meets the standard set forth in 42 
U.S.C. §1396a(a)(13)(A). Thus, the federal law establishes sub-
stantive limitations to a state's rate-setting authority. It is 
Plaintiffs' contention that Defendant established the "flat rate 
system" of reimbursement in violation of these substantive limi-
tations. No objective study of the effect of the rates on any 
individual facility was conducted, and the rate was essentially 
based upon budgetary concerns. This is clearly in violation of 
federal laws. The State has argued all along that it need not 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 5 -
look at any facilities' costs, efficiencies, or economies -- that 
the flat rate itself defines "efficiency" and "economy" for 
purposes of federal law. This brief will demonstrate that such 
reasoning is not consistent with federal lav?. Furthermore, any 
"findings" and "assurances" submitted to HHS by the State, having 
no basis in fact, are defective as a matter of law. 
2. The State's classification of a number of Plain-
tiffs' patients as "intermediate" rather than "skilled", is 
arbitrary and capricious. These patients were appropriately 
classified as "skilled" by medical personnel who actually examine 
and treat ther. The State, never having seen or examined any of 
the patients, arbitrarily misclassified them as a further cost-
savings measure. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE UTAH STATE MEDICAID PLAN FAILS TO COMPLY 
WITH FEDERAL LAW AND IS THEREFORE INVALID 
A. The Utah State Plan Exceeds the Substantive 
Limitations of the Federal Statute 
The Appellant, Weber Memorial Care Center, is a provider 
of Medicaid services within the State of Utah and, as such, is 
subject to both state and federal regulations due to its parti-
cipation in Title XIX, and has done its best to comply with all 
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relevant rules and regulations at both the state and federal 
levels since the commencement of its operation, 
Weber Memorial accepts patients who qualify for medical 
assistance under the Utah state plan which was filed pursuant to 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act with the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services. Presently, however, the Department of Health 
of the State of Utah refuses to pay a fair and legally required 
rate of reimbursement to Weber Memorial for care rendered to the 
said patients. As already pointed out, the federal statute 
underlying the federal Medicaid regulations is found at 42 U.S.C. 
§1396a(a)13(A). The statute, as well as the federal regulations, 
are set forth in the Addendum in full (Addendum-1). The 
regulations, of course, reiterate the requirement set: forth in 
the statute that rates must be "reasonable and adequate to meet 
the costs that must be incurred by efficiently and economically 
operated providers to provide services in conformity with 
applicable State and Federal laws, regulations and quality and 
safety standards." (Emphasis added.) 42 C.F.R. §447.253(b)(1). 
The State is required to make "findings" that "the rates used to 
reimburse providers satisfy the requirements of the regulations." 
Id. at 447.253(b). After these "findings" are completed, the 
State must then make and submit "assurances" to the federal 
government that the requirements of the statute, as well as "all 
other parts of [the regulations]" are being met. Id. at 
447.253(a). The State's 
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plan, which must be formulated pursuant to the statute and 
regulations mentioned above, must incorporate the affirmative 
requirements of the statute and regulations. 42 C.F.R. 
§447.252. 
In this case, the hearing officer, as well as the 
District Court, apparently glossed over the requirement of "find-
ings" and "assurances" in connection with a state plan. Appar-
ently, because the State did submit assurances which were accept-
ed by the federal government, the hearing officer failed to look 
beyond the surface at those assurances in order to determine 
whether or not they were supported by "substantive findings" and 
therefore had a basis in fact. 
Again, the regulations implementing the federal Medicaid 
statutes require that the state Medicaid agency must find that 
the rates to reimburse providers satisfy the requirements of law, 
i.e., that the rates "are reasonable and adequate to meet the 
costs that must be incurred by efficiently and economically opera-
ted facilities." 42 C.F.R. §447.250(a). As the record in this 
matter is reviewed, it becomes clear that the Department of Health 
of the State of Utah has not made findings sufficient to provide 
assurances to the Department of Health and Human Services, (here-
inafter the HHS), of compliance with federal law. In fact, no 
findings at all have been made by the Secretary or the State of 
Utah relative to what methodology will meet the federal require-
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ments. As the deposition of Vaughn Emmett, Director of the Bureau 
of Program Review, Department of Health, State of Utah, indicates, 
there have been no studies conducted by the Department of Health 
that have examined any provider in the state to determine whether 
such providers are efficiently and economically operated. 
In Thomas v. Johnston, 557 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Tex. 1983), 
the District Court granted the provider's motion for a preliminary 
injunction, in part, for the reason that the state rate setters 
failed to examine actual costs and provider efficiencies. 
From all that appears to this Court . . . 
[the state] never sought to ascertain, and 
thus never knew, even the approximate extent 
of provision of unnecessary services or of 
provider inefficiency. No attempt was made 
to go outside of provider cost reports in an 
effort to determine the extent or nature of 
unnecessary services; admittedly, [the state] 
undertook no independent study of any facil-
ity's provision of services, or its economy 
and efficiency, nor did it attempt to deter-
mine in any manner what the cost of a required 
service should be. 
(Emphasis added). JUK at 906. Similarly, the Court found that 
the rate-setters failed to "ascertain whether facilities within 
the same level of care indeed had a similar "mix" of residents 
before choosing to rely upon the Department of Health's Certifi-
cation as its primary basis for determining adequacy of reim-
bursement rates." 2A# *n t^ie context of this case, the record 
will likewise reflect the Department's failure to conduct any 
"independent study of any facility's provision of services, or 
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its economy and ef f iciency," nor did it examine the "costs11 of 
any services at Weber Memorial or any other particular facility. 
Additionally, as discussed in Section III below, the special 
"mix" of residents at Weber Memorial, or other facilities for 
that matter, was in no way considered in the rate-setting pro-
cess. As the Court in Thomas v. Johnston found, such a "manner" 
of adopting the "reimbursement rate structure was arbitrary, cap-
ricious, and in violation of federal law." Id. at 904. 
In Nebraska Health Care Association v. Dunning, 778 F.2d 
1291 (8th Cir. 1985) cert, denied, U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 947 
(1987), the District Court was upheld on appeal in its finding 
that the Nebraska state plan was invalid. After citing the 
regulations discussed above requiring findings and assurances, 
the Court stated: 
The Defendants admit the Department did not 
conduct an any objective analysis or studies 
to determine the effect of §68-720,s limitations 
on the level of care Medicaid patients would 
receive or the extent to which facilities would 
continue to participate in Medicaid. Slip Op. 9. 
Thus, the quantified estimates of various 
effects of the 3.75% limitation, required to 
be submitted by the applicable regulation. . . 
could not have been submitted, because the staff 
never conducted any objective analysis or stud-
ies to determine these effects. Accordingly, as 
the District Court found, 'there is no objective 
evidence to support the assurances which the 
Department gave to the federal government. Id. 
at 10. The State's submission of its new plan 
was simply not accompanied by any information 
even purporting to meet the requirements of the 
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federal regulations. This fact, without more, 
is sufficient to invalidate HCFA's purported 
approval of the 3,75% "cap" for the fiscal 
year 1982-83. There was no factual basis for 
the assurances Nebraska submitted to HCFA, and 
HCFA's approval, being based on unsupported 
assurances, is without legal effect. (citation 
omitted). 
(Emphasis added). I^d_. at 1294. The same rationale applies to 
Utah's "findings" and "assurances." That is, as the record demon-
strates, having failed to conduct and prepare "findings" in accor~ 
dance with the regulations, any "assurances" submitted to the fed-
eral government, having no "factual basis" would be "without 
legal effect." 
As the Court stated in Hillhaven Corp. v Wisconsin Dept. 
of Health, 634 F.Supp. 1313, 1319 (E.D. Wis. 1986): 
The failure to provide the requisite findings, 
assurances, and additional information set forth 
in 42 C.F.R. § 442.255(b) with respect to modifi-
cation of reimbursement rates under a state Medi-
caid plan renders invalid those modified rates 
and the state statute [or regulation] under which 
they were established. Edgewater Nursing Center, 
Inc. v. Miller, 678 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1982); 
Nebraska Health Care Association v Dunning, 778 
F.2d 1291, 1294 (8th Cir. 1985); Washington State 
Heath Facilities Ass'n v. State of Washington Dept. 
of Social and Health Services, 698 F.2d 964, 965 
(9th Cir. 1982); Forbes Health Systems v. Harris, 
661 F.2d 282, 286 (3d Cir. 1981). 
The Court, finding that the State failed to provide the requisite 
findings and assurances, enjoined the State from enforcing the 
rates set in violation of the regulations. Id. 
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Federal law also requires that methods and standards be 
developed by the State in devising a reimbursement system. 42 
C.F.R. §447.252(b). However, in this case, there was no testing, 
nor were any standards or methods established by Utah regarding 
the efficiency or economy of services provided. Instead, based 
upon conversations with some health care providers legislators 
and others with an interest in the matter, the State established 
a budget oriented, flat-rate reimbursement system. There was 
never a substantive finding by the State of Utah that "the rates 
to reimburse the providers satisfy the requirements11 of the regu-
lations or 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(13)(A). 
As the Court in Thomas v. Johnston, supra, pointed out, 
The statute clearly and expressly leaves room 
for states to cut unnecessary costs in a wide 
variety of ways. On the other hand, however, 
it manifestly imposes a substantive limitation 
on state governmental action — that rates deter-
mined by Medicaid agencies must be high enough 
to compensate efficiently and economically oper-
ated providers for costs necessarily incurred 
in providing the type of care for their resi-
dents that conforms to all applicable state 
and federal laws and requirements . . .As stat-
ed above, under this standard, s"tate Medicaid 
agencies are free to deny providers compensa-
tion for provision of unnecessary services. 
Likewise, the states are not required to pay 
all costs incurred by providers that are not 
operating efficiently and economically. Thus, 
states not only have a great deal of flexi-
bility in selecting the methods by which 
rates will be determined, but are also accorded 
freedom to decide what costs are necessary or 
unnecessary, and to determine whether and 
which providers are operating efficiently 
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and economically. In addition, the develop-
ment of the Medicaid Act and the evolution of 
the reimbursement system away from Medicare 
principles of reimbursement make it clear that 
states are not required to make their decisions 
concerning 'efficiency and economy' and * adequacy1 
with the greatest degree of precision. Never-
theless, the bottom line of the federal statu-
tory standard, the substantive limit placed 
by Congress upon the states, is that rates must 
be sufficient to compensate efficiently and 
economically operated providers for the neces-
sary costs they incur in providing required 
care to their residents. 
(Emphasis added). Id_. at 909. It is submitted that the State of 
Utah, through its Department of Health, clearly exceeded the "sub-
stantive limitation11 imposed by the federal statute. 
In the initial hearing, the Executive Director of the 
Utah Health Care Association, Dennis McFall, also a member of the 
Flat-Rate Committee which formulated the modified flat-rate 
system, testified as follows: 
Q. I'm going to .-.•-k you some specific questions 
about those factors the Committee considered or 
did not consider in the adoption of the flat rate 
system about which we are speaking. Number one, 
did the Committee consider any rules or regula-
tions of the state of Utah relating to the effi-
cient or economic operation of long-term health 
care facilities in the state of Utah? 
A. To my knowledge there was no discussion 
relating to efficiency or economy of operations. 
Q. Did the Flat Rate Committee make any specific 
decision, Mr. McFall, as to whether the flat rate 
[established] was sufficient to meet the cost of 
a long-term health provider which was efficiently 
and economically operated? 
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A. Again, not in relation to efficiency or 
economically operated, no. 
Q. Did the Committee reach any conclusion, Mr. 
McFall, as to whether the flat rate system 
established by it established a rate which was 
sufficient to meet the costs which must be in-
curred by an efficient and economical pro-
vider participating in the State of Utah Medi-
caid system? 
A. No. 
Q. Did the Committee have any empirical data 
before it, Mr. McFall, which would have allowed 
it to test for efficient and economical opera-
tions by the long-term health care providers? 
A. No. 
(Hearing transcript, at 153-54). See also, testimony of Roy Dunn, 
(Hearing transcript at 57-58). 
Again, as suggested by the Thomas court, when the regula-
tions require the State to make certain "findings," the State must 
look at economy and efficiency of actual operations. Operations 
occur at individual facilities. Thus, looking only at broad pro-
fitability percentages is looking in the wrong place. Some of the 
most profitable nursing homes may very well be the least economic 
and least efficient providers of quality care. See, Children* s 
Memorial Hospital v. Illinois Department of Public Aid, 562 F. 
Supp. 165, 171 (N.D. 111. 1983) ("an amount double the Illinois1 
ceiling might perhaps be paid out only to inefficient providers"). 
Mr. Elliott, the Administrator of Weber Memorial Care Center, for 
example, attempted to explain to the hearing officer that which 
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probably needs very little explanation: that bottom line costs do 
not necessarily indicate efficiency or the lack thereof. For 
example, Weber Memorial, prior to its purchase and when the county 
owned it, did not have to pay property taxes, but now does, 
because it is privately owned. (Hearing Transcript at 478). When 
asked what factors would account for a higher cost provider being 
actually more efficient and economical than a lower cost provider, 
Mr. Elliott answered: 
There are several variables that can be con-
sidered. (1) The primary one is the needs of 
patients in various facilities may be different. 
Some may require more care that would involve 
more services. The facility may provide more 
services. One facility may provide more services 
to that patient than another. We have to look 
at the patient's rehabilitation potential in 
different areas of different facilities. Medi-
cal supplies going to those patients may vary, 
and the amount of supplies going to an indivi-
dual patient may vary. 
Utility costs may be different. As stated 
earlier, climates may be different. Some 
utilities may be more expensive. Some facilities 
may use a different type of heating fuel that 
may cost less. The labor market in a rural area 
may be different than in a large metropolitan 
area as far as costs of help and the costs of 
obtaining qualified help. The mill levy in 
different counties. . .construction of the 
facility may vary. The size of the facility 
and the ground maintenance costs may vary. 
The ages of the facilities may vary, and the 
property costs will vary in relation to the 
depreciation, insurance, taxes, etc. 
(Hearing Transcript at 480). These cost and efficiency factors 
must be taken into account in the rate-setting process. In this 
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states shall be disbursed, and that any state 
law or regulation inconsistent with such federal 
terms and conditions is to that extent invalid 
. . .It is equally clear that to the extent HEW 
has approved any [state law or regulation] which 
conflicts with §406(a) of the Social Security 
Act. . . such approval is inconsistent with the 
controlling federal statute. 
Ex Parte Laverne Geriatric Center, Inc., supra, 480 So.2d at 565, 
quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968); 2 Am. Jur. 2d 
Administrative Law §300 ("It is a fundamental legal principle that 
a rule or regulation which is broader than the statute empowering 
the making of rules, or which oversteps the boundaries of the 
statutes by extending or restricting the statute contrary to its 
meaning, cannot be sustained"). Thus, "even though the [federal] 
Department of Health and Human Services had previously approved 
the plan," "the Secretary's approval is in nowise a conclusive 
determination of the plan's validity, but rather, is subject to 
judicial review." d^_. at 595. See, also, Alabama Hospital 
Association v. Beasley, 702 F.2d 955 (11th Cir. 1983); Atchinson 
Topeka and Santa Fe By. Co. v. United States, 617 F.2d 485, 496 
(7th Cir. 1980) ("A court does not defer to an administrative 
construction of a statute when there are 'compelling indications 
that it was wrong.1"). 
As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently found, a 
provider plaintiff does have a right to have its claim heard on 
the merits, and to receive a judicial determination as to 
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judgment or damage actions for rate reimbursements have been 
entertained by numerous state and federal courts. See, e.g., 
California Hosp. Ass'n. v. Obledo, 602 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1979); 
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. Weiner, 569 F.2d 1156 (1st Cir. 
1978); Massachusetts Hosp. Ass'n. v. Harris, 500 F.Supp. 1270 (D. 
Mass 1980); Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. Sargent, 397 F.Supp. 
1056 (D. Mass. 1975); Monomouth Medical Center v. State, 80 N.J. 
299, 403 A.2d 487, cert, denied, 444 U.S. 942, 100 S.Ct. 297, 62 
L.Ed. 2d 308 (1979). Such a private right of action has been 
consistently recognized by many courts; it is, therefore, 'simply 
beyond peradventrue.f Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, U.S. 
, 103 S.Ct. 683, 687, 74 L.Ed. 2d 548 (1983)n. The point is, 
therefore, that judicial oversight is appropriate with respect, to 
the Medicaid reimbursement rates set forth by state administra-
tors. This Court is in no way obligated, as the hearing officer 
apparently felt he was, to defer to the "expertise" or judgment 
of the state officials. A state plan which is out of compliance 
with federal standards is certainly subject to judicial 
intervention. 
Weber Memorial, therefore, respectfully urges the Court 
to carefully scrutinize the rate-setting procedures in question 
here in light of the "substantive limitations" of federal law 
discussed above. When the record is reviewed, it is submitted 
that it will become clear that those limitations were breached 
with the imposition of the flat-rate system. 
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Tennis McFall, member of the Flat Pate Committee, testi-
fied that upon threat of Dr. Mason to move to a less desirable, 
almost punitive, reimbursement system, the Committee recommended 
the modified flat rate system. During the hearing he testified 
that: 
Q. Mr. McFall, were there discussions on the 
part of Dr. Mason regarding the necessity with 
the Flat Rate Committee to stay within the FY 
1982 Medicaid budget regardless of what kind 
of reimbursement methodology was arrived at? 
A. It's my impression that there were, yes. I 
recall several times, statements made by Dr. 
Mason that we must remember we've only got 
this number of dollars. We've only got this 
amount. 
(Hearing Transcript at 166). See also, testimony of Jay Winslow, 
(Hearing Transcript at 412-13.) 
It is clear that budget constraints were a major factor 
in establishing the modified flat rate system. Contrary to the 
implication in Judge Fishier1s decision, the Court need not find 
that those budget constraints were the sole basis for the State's 
rates in order to find them illegal, but merely that budget con-
cern were a major or significant factor. See, e.g. California 
Hospital Association v. Schweiker, supra. 
In Hillhaven Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health, supra, 
the court invalidated a three-month rate freeze by the State of 
Wisconsin. While the court found as a matter of fact that the 
freeze was based solely upon budgetary concerns, the decision is 
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length of the freeze would appear to be a perti-
nent consideration only if the state had undertaken 
a study prior to the enactment of the freeze which 
indicated that a three-month moratorium on rate 
increases would not affect the reasonableness and 
adequacy of the rates paid due to prevailing econo-
mic factors. A freeze [or rate] imposed without 
such considerations having been made beforehand, 
whether it be for three months or longer, would 
result in reasonable and adequate rates only by 
chance and not be design. 
(Emphas is added .) I d 634 F. Si lpp * L u20 • Thus , ti e Coi lr t 
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Geriatric Center, supra, 480 So.2d at 568. As the House 
Committee which formulated 42 U.S.C. §1396a(e)(13)(A) stated: 
The Committee is concerned that the reimburse-
ment methods established by the states recog-
nize the need to provide a full range of both 
primary care and tertiary care services to ~ 
Medicaid beneficiaries and take into account 
the differences in operating costs of the var-
ious types of facilities needed to provide 
this broad scope of services. For example, 
the Committee does not intend that the only 
facility providing a specific type of treat-
ment . . .not be available to Medicaid bene-
ficiaries because the State's payment level 
is inadequate to meet the basic cost of care 
in that facility. 
2 H.F. Rep. No. 158 at 293-94. 
In Thomas v. Johnston, supra, 557 F.Supp. at 914-15, the 
Court found that, "[a]gainst the background of Defendant's 
fundamental lack of information and their failure to consider 
highly relevant factors bearing upon the adequacy of reimburse-
ment rates," the state agency's overreliance upon budgetary 
considerations ncross[ed] the boundaries of permissible 
consideration of budgetary restraints and may, indeed, represent 
the very behavior that Congress sought to prevent." 
As the Court noted, 
the state Medicaid agency must make an object-
ive, principled decision with regard to what 
rates are reasonable and adequate. The law is 
clear that " [ inadequate state appropriations 
do not excusTe noncompliance?*1 Alabama Nursing 
home Association v. Harris, 617 F.2d at 396. 
This must be true, for "[i]f a state could evade 
the requirements of the Act simply by failing 
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and economical in his operations will have his costs met. When 
we have a budget-driven, arbitrarily established rate which 
ignores the very intent of Congress and goes against the grain of 
the implementing legislation, as is the case in Utah, it is the 
duty of the courts to take corrective action. 
In this case, then, when one considers the total lack of 
objective information and principled decision making that went 
into the flat rate system, coupled with the underlying budgetary 
concerns present when the Flat Pate Committee deliberated, one 
can only conclude, as did the Court in Thomas v Johnston, that 
the current [Utah] reimbursement rate struc-
ture [is] arbitrary, capricious and inconsis-
tent with federal law and regulations, and 
that Defendant's findings and assurances to 
HCFA that reimbursement rates complied with 
the statutory standards likewise were arbi-
trary and failed to conform to federal law. 
Id. at 915. 
II 
EVEN IF THE UTAH STATE PLAN IS NOT INVALID PER SEf THE 
HEARING OFFICER'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW WEBER MEMORIAL THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE OF ITS COSTS AND TO PROVE 
IT IS AN EFFICIENTLY AND ECONOMICALLY OPERATED FACILITY, 
WAS CONTRARY TO THE APPLICABLE FEDERAL STATUTE AND REGULA-
TIONS AND IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING 
The Hearing Officer's Evidentiary Rulings Denied 
Weber Memorial the Opportunity to Demonstrate That 
the Reimbursement Pates in Question Are Arbitrary 
and Capricious as Applied. 
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and adequate within the meaning of the statute." Hillhaven Corp, 
v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health, supra, 634 F.Supp. at 1318, citing 
42 C.F.R. § 447.252(a)(1982). In this case, the preliminary 
ruling of the hearing officer referred to earlier speaks for 
itself. Several months prior to the hearing, he effectively 
closed the door to the evidence most crucial to Weber Memorial's 
case. Indeed, the transcript of the hearing is replete with 
examples of how the hearing officer's ruling effectively denied 
Weber Memorial an opportunity for a fair hearing. See, Excerpts 
from Transcript of Formal Hearing, Hearing held August 3, 1984 
Before Brian L. Farr, Administrative Law Judge, Addendum. 
Plaintiff was effectively denied any opportunity to prove that 
the rate "in fact" was not "reasonable and adequate" to meet its 
costs "within the meaning of the statute." 
In Children's Memorial Hospital v. Illinois Department 
of Public Aid, 562 F. Supp. 165 (N.D. 111. 1983), an individual 
hospital, (which is reimbursed under the same statute involved 
here), brought an injunctive proceeding against the Illinois 
agency responsible for administering the Medicaid program in that 
state. The state had imposed a percentile "ceiling" on 
reimbursement. The Court, in determining that the rates in 
question were "arbitrary and irrational" as applied to the 
plaintiff, made several observations which apply in this case. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 27 -
[The provider] is being penalized not for 
any inefficiency but because its patients 
fall into the more complex ends of the 
more complex pri mary diagnosti c groups. 
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[The provider] t ias presented compelling 
evidence that [the rule establishing the 
ceiling rate] does not present a reasonable 
and adequate plan for reimbursing Medicaid 
costs at a hospital with Children's Memorial's 
specia1 mix of patients. As applied to [the 
provider], [the rule] is the kind of arbitrary 
plan both Senate and House committees were at 
ains to deny Section 13(A) would justify . 7 
The provider] has a reasonable likelihood of * 
success on its claim [that the rule] violates" 
Section 13(A) by failing to provide reimburse-
ment for an "efficiently and economically opeFa-
ted" . . . facility." 
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It is a fundamental principle of due process that a 
party appearing before an administrative body is entitled to a 
fair hearing, including the opportunity to be heard at a meaning-
ful time and in a meaningful manner. The effect of the hearing 
officer's ruling, as well as the District Court's affirmance 
thereof, is to deny Weber Memorial a meaningful and fair hearing 
on the central issue of the entire statutory scheme. 
Thus, while the hearing officer certainly had the 
authority under his fact-finding powers to find that Weber 
Memorial was not jj^ fact an efficiently and economically operat-
ing facility, or that it was in fact having its costs met, etc., 
he refused to even take any evidence on those issues. In 
essence, Weber Memorial has never had its day in court. 
A participant provider in the Medicaid system no doubt 
has a property interest in achieving or enforcing its rights 
under that system. See, e.g. Bowens v. North Carolina Department 
of Human Resources, 710 F.2d 1015 (4th Cir. 1983). The question 
in this case, insofar as the Constitution is concerned is what 
type of hearing is required. The particular type of hearing 
"must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those 
who are to be heard.ff Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 
(1970). 
In this case, the only way Weber Memorial can be heard 
in a meaningful manner is to permit it to demonstrate its costs 
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State at some $7.00 to $8.00 per day higher than the latter. 
Apparently, the State uses the classification system, heavily 
weighted toward classifying patients as "intermediate,11 in order 
to cut its costs under Medicaid. Even though on a national basis 
approximately forty per cent (40%) of patients are classified as 
"skilled" (Hearing Transcript at 217), Utah classifies only three 
(3%) to ten (10%) per cent of all patients as "skilled." This is 
obviously a cost savings to the state, but further places a 
burden on a provider who must provide the service to the patients 
at the skill level required, regardless of a bureaucrat's 
arbitrary designation. Skilled patients, by definition, require 
more intensive care (Fearing Transcript at 445). Staffing must 
be higher, as is the use of ancillary materials and supplies. 
Weber Memorial routinely sends its evaluation regarding 
the needs of patients to the Department, and designates the 
patient as "skilled" or "intermediate." This is based on a 
hands-on review of the patient by qualified health care profes-
sionals. Yet, the assessment of the patient is routinely reduced 
by the officials within the Department, and the "intermediate" 
rather than the "skilled" designation is over used by persons who 
have never seen these patients. (Hearing Transcript at 430; 
545-547). Weber Memorial estimates that thirty-eight (38) 
patients at the facility, at the time of the hearing, had been 
arbitrarily classified by Department at an annual cost of approx-
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imately One Hundred Twenty Thousand Dollars ($120,000.00) -- a 
significant hardship for Weber Memorial. (Hearing Transcript at 
402). This further illustrates that the flat rate system does 
not work effectively to satisfy the requirement of federal law. 
See, Children's Memorial Hospital v. Illinois Department of 
Public Aid, supra. These unreimbursed costs are never paid by 
the State of Utah and must be absorbed by the provider. Patients 
and their needs, in the aggregate, do not change. Reimbursement 
does change downward arbitrarily, so that the skilled population 
is squeezed more and more each year. 
Coupled with the Utah change in regulations so that the 
Appellant can no longer bill for laboratory, pharmacy, and x-ray 
services (Hearing Transcript at 734), it is no wonder that the 
costs of the facility are not being met. This illustrates that 
the flat rate system does not and cannot comply with federal law 
in Weber Memorial's case. As the Court in Children1s Memorial 
Hospital, supra, found, the law requires that a facility's 
"special mix" of patients be taken into account in determining 
whether the rate, as applied, is "arbitrary and irrational." 
Children's Memorial Hospital, supra, 562 F. Supp. 173. See, 
also, Thomas v. Johnston supra, 557 F. Supp. at 912 (the Depart-
ment "did not take adequate steps to investigate the problem of 
provider specialization or its possible consequences, [nor did it 
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attempt] to verify its primary assumption that all facilities are 
responsible for approximately the same "mix of resident needs"). 
IV. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED 
A DEFERENTIAL STANDARD TO THE AGENCY'S 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
One final point needs to be made concerning the standard 
of review in this case. In reviewing the Memorandum Decision of 
Judge Fishier (Addendum - 18) and the Final Judgment by Judge 
Daniels (Addendum - 19), it is evident that the District Court 
applied a deferential standard to the review of the Executive 
Director's decision with its incorporation of the Hearing 
Officer's findings and recommendations. Apparently, the District 
Court felt constrained by UCA § 26-23-1 (3) to rule in favor of 
the State if the Executive Director's "final determination was 
supported by a residuum of legally admissible evidence in the 
record and was not arbitrary and capricious." As pointed out at 
length already, Plaintiffs submit that the record does not 
support the prior determination even as adjudged by the deferen-
tial standard. However, the District Court's ruling is funda-
mentally flawed for another reason. An Appellate Court is never 
required to defer to an agency ruling on questions of law and on 
rulings on the admissibility of evidence. The cryptic decision 
of the District Judges below, on their face, reflect a failure 
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to recognize the appropriate standard of review on these 
questions. Furthermore, this Court certainly has the inherent 
authority to review and correct erroneous rulings of law without 
any deference to either the agency's findings and conclusions or 
the District Court's erroneous determination. 
In State of Minnesota v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 
1983), in a Medicaid dispute between a state and the federal 
Department of Health and Human Services, the Court of Appeals 
rviewed the decision of the District Court which had reviewed the 
findings of the Health and Human Services Departmental Grant 
Appeals Board. The Appeals Board had disallowed federal 
financial participation to the state for certain costs incurred 
in three community residential facilities. The specific question 
concerned whether the three facilities were "institutions for 
mental diseases." If they were, they did not qualify for federal 
Medicaid participation. As the Court noted in deciding this 
question: 
The HHS' Department Grant Appeals Board reached 
conclusions of both fact and law. The agency's 
formal findings of fact will be upheld if sup-
ported by substantial evidence in the record 
considered as a whole. (Citations omitted). 
In contrast, the agency's guidelines inter-
preting a statutory term and regulation ultimately 
involve questions of law which are to be resolved 
by the Court. See, Bratterton v. Francis, 432 UTS. 
416, 424-26 & n.9, 97 S.Ct. 2399, 2404-06 & n.9 
53 L.Ed.2d 448 (1977); Social Security Board v. 
Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 368-69, 66 S.Ct. 637, 642-
43, 90 L.Ed.2d 718 (1946); White Industries, Inc. 
v. Federal Aviation Administration, 692 F.2d 532, 
534 (8th Cir. 1982); 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). 
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(Emphasis added). JU[., 718 F.2d at 860. Particularly because 
the interpretation of a federal statute is involved here, and 
because a determination of Congressional intent is a necessary 
element of that interpretation, the agency's own interpretation 
of the law is entitled to no deference. As stated in Salt Lake 
City Corporation v. Department of Employment, 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 
(Utah 1982) 
In administratitive cases, our scope of review 
of an agency's decision as to legal questions and 
questions of mixed law and fact is generally 
broader than our scope of review of questions of 
fact. On most questions of statutory construction, 
with some exceptions, our review is plenary with 
no deference accorded the administrative determin-
ation. 
(Emphasis added). See, also, Madison v. Alaska Department of 
Fish and Game, 696 P.1d 168 (Alaska 1985) (issues of statutory 
interpretation and whether administrative board acted within its 
statutory authority "fall into the realm of special competency of 
the courts;'1 statutory interpretation of the words "customary and 
traditional" at issue); Gardiner v. Arizona Department of 
Economic Security, 623 P.2d 33, 36 (Ariz. App. 1980) ("court may 
substitute its judgment for the agency's conclusions regarding 
the legal effect of [the] facts"); International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers, Local 1357 v. Hawaiian Telephone Co., 713 
P.2d 943 (Hawaii 1986) (agency's legal conclusions are freely 
revieweable by the courts); Dangerfield v. Montgomery Ward Co., 
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Inc., 694 P.2d 439 (Kan. 1985) (questions of law are always open 
to review by courts); Conwell v. City of Albuquerque, 637 P.2d 
567, 569 (N.M. 1981) (Court "may correct the [administrative] 
decisionmaker's misapplication of the law"); Clarke v. Shoreline 
School District No. 412, King County, 720 P.2d 793 (Wash. 1986) 
(reviewing court reviews the issues of law de novo). 
In this case, then, because a resolution of this case 
requires an interpretation of the "Boren Amendment", 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(13)(A) and the implementing federal regulations, the 
District Court erred in applying a deferential standard. This 
Court may then interpret the statute de_ novo in arriving at its 
decision. Additionally, since the refusal to permit the 
introdution of the evidence regarding Plaintiffs1 costs and 
efficiencies, as discussed previously, was clearly prejudicial to 
Plaintiffs1 case, as appears on the record, Downey State Bank v. 
Major-Blakeney Corporation, 578 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1978), and was 
contrary to the underlying purpose and intent of the governing 
statute, this Court should reverse the judgment of the Court 
below. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Weber Memorial respectfully 
requests that the Court declare the State of Utah Medicaid Plan, 
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and particularly the "flat rate" aspect thereof, invalid. 
Alternatively, Appellant simply seeks the opportunity to submit 
evidence before a hearing officer demonstrating that it is an 
efficiently and economically operated facility within the meaning 
of the federal law, but that it is not having its costs met 
within the flat rate. 
Finally, Weber Memorial also seeks a reversal of the 
previous rulings concerning the classification of patients. 
DATED this 3 oK day of /?p^;/ 1987. 
HOUPT, ECKERSLY & DOWNES 
U\0Q..Jo 
W i l l i am Dowries 
LOJEK & HALL, CTD. 
Donald W. Lojek 
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tH. 7 MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
§ 1 3 9 6 a . State plans for medical assistance 
(a) Contents 
A State plan for medical assistance must— 
42 § 1396a PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELF 
any such care and services furnished any individual for which payi 
would otherwise be made to the State with respect to him under sec 
1396b of this title; 
(12) provide that, in determining whether an individual is bl 
there shall be an examination by a physician skilled in the disease 
the eye or by an optometrist, whichever the individual may select; 
(13) provide— 
(A) for payment (except where the State agency is subject tc 
order under section 1396m of this title) of the hospital, ski 
nursing facility, and intermeL ate care facility services provi 
under the plan through the use of rates (determined in accorda 
with methods and standards developed by the State and which 
the case of hospitals, take into account the situation of hospi 
which serve a disproportionate number of low income patk 
with special needs and provide, in the case of hospital patients 
ceiving services at an inappropriate level of care (under conditio 
similar to those described in section 1395x(v)(l)(G) of this tit 
for lower reimbursement rates reflecting the level of care actus 
received (in a manner consistent with section 1395x(v)(l)(G) 
this title) which the State finds, and makes assurances satisfact< 
to the Secretary, are reasonable and adequau to meet the cc 
which musi be incurred by efficiently and economically opera' 
facilities in order to provide care and services in conformity w 
applicable State and Federal laws, regulations, and quality a 
safety standards and to assure that individuals eligible for medii 
assistance have reasonable access (taking into account geograpl 
location and reasonable travel time) to inpatient hospital scrvic 
of adequate quality; and such State makes further assurances, s 
isfactory to the Secretary, for the filing of uniform cost reports 
each hospital, skilled nursing facility, and intermediate care facili 
and periodic audits by the State of such reports; and 
(IS) provide— 
(A) for payment (except where the State agency is lubject to an ordei 
under section 1396m of this title) of the hospital, skilled nursing facility, anc 
intermediate care facility services provided under the plan through the us< 
of rates (determined in accordance wi'h methods and standards developec 
by the State and which, in the case of hospitals, take into account the 
situation of hospitals which serve a disproportionate number of low income 
patients with special needs and provide, in the case of hospital patients 
receiving services at an inappropriate level of care (under conditions similar 
to those described in section 1395x(vXlMG) of this title), for lower reim-
bursement rates reflecting the level of care actually received (in a manner 
consistent with section 1395x(v)(lKG) of this title) which the State finds, and 
makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary*, are reasonable and ade-
quate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economi-
cally operated facilities in order to provide care and services in conformity 
with applicable State and Federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety 
standards and to assure that individuals eligible for medical assistance have 
reasonable access (taking into account geographic location and reasonable 
travel time) to inpatient hospital services of adequate quality; and such 
State makes further assurances, satisfactory to the Secretary, for the filing 
of uniform cost reports by each hospiti?, skilled nursing facility, and 
intermediate care facility and periodic audits by the State of such reports; 
42 § 1396 
1984 AMENDMENT 
ADDENDUM - 1 -
Health Core Financing Administration, 
42 CF* Ch. IV (10-145 Edition) 
t40 PR 58680. Dec. 3, 1981; 47 FR 8567. Mar. 
1. 1982. as amended at 48 FR 56057. Dec. 19. 
1983J 
Subpart C—Payment for Inpatient 
Hospital and Long-Term Cart Facil-
ity Services 
SOURCE* 46 FR 47971. Sept. 30. 1981, 
unless otherwise noted. 
6 447.250 Basis and purpose. 
(a) This subpart implements section 
1902(a)(13)(A) of the Act, which re-
quires that the State plan provide for 
payment for hospital and long-term 
care facility services through the use 
of rates that the, State finds, and 
makes assurances satisfactory to the 
Secretary, are reasonable and ade-
quate to meet the costs that must be 
incurred by efficiently and econorrn-
cally operated facilities to provide 
services in conformity with State and 
Federal laws, regulations, and quality 
and safety standards. 
(b) Section 447.253(a)(2) implements 
section 1902(a)(30) of the Act. which 
requires that payments be consistent 
with efficiency, economy, and quality 
of care; 
(c) Section 447.271 implements sec-
tion 1903UX3) of the Act. which re-
quires that payments for inpatient 
hospital services not exceed the hospi-
tal's customary charges. 
(d) Section 447.280 implements sec-
tion 1913(b) of the Act. which con-
cerns reimbursement for long-term 
care services furnished by swing-bed 
hospitals. 
(46 FR 56057. Dec. 19. 19831 
1447.252 State plan requirements. 
(a) The plan must provide that the 
requirements of this subpart are met. 
(b) The plan must specify compre-
hensively the methods and standards 
used by the agency to set payment 
rates In a manner consistent with 45 
CFR 201.2. 
(c) If the agency chooses to apply 
the cost limits established under Medi-
care (see 1405.460 of this chapter) on 
an individual provider basis, the plan 
must specify this requirement. 
(Approved by the Office of Management 
and Budget under control number 0938-
0193) 
(48 FR 58058. Dec. 19. 1983) 
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• 447.253 Other requirement*. 
(a) State assurances. In order to re-
ceive HCFA approval of a significant-
State plan change in payment meth-
ods and standards, the Medicaid 
agency must make assurances satisfac-
tory to HCFA that the requirements 
set forth in paragraphs (b) through 
(g) of this section are being met, must 
submit the related information re-
quired by §447.255 of this subpart, 
and must comply with all other re-
quirements of this subpart. 
(b) Findings. Whenever the Medic-
aid agency makes a significant change 
in its methods and standards, but not 
less often than annually, the agency 
must make the following findings: 
(1) Payment rates, (i) The Medicaid 
agency pays for inpatient hospital 
services and long-term care facility 
services through the use of rates that 
are reasonable and adequate to meet 
the costs that must be incurred by ef-
ficiently and economically operated 
providers "*to provide services in con-
formity with applicable State and Fed-
eral laws, regulations, and quality and 
safety standards. 
(ii) With respect to inpatient hospi-
tal services— 
(A) The methods and standards used 
to determine payment rates take into 
account the situation of hospitals 
which serve a disproportionate 
number of low income patients with 
special needs; 
(B) The methods and standards used 
to determine payment rates provide 
that reimbursement for hospital pa-
tients receiving services at an inappro-
priate level of care under conditions 
similar to those described in section 
186KVX1 KG) of the Act will be made 
at lower rates, reflecting the level of 
care actually received, in a manner 
consistent with section 1861(v)(l)(C); 
and 
(C) The payment rates are adequate 
to assure that recipients have reasona-
ble access, taking into account geo-
graphic location and reasonable travel 
time, to inpatient hospital services of 
adequate quality. 
(2) Upper.limits. The Medicaid agen-
cy's estimated average proposed pay-
ment rate is reasonably expected to 
pay no more in the aggregate for inpa-
tient hospital services or long-term 
care facility services than the amount 
that the agency reasonably estimates 
would be paid for the services under 
the Medicare principles of reimburse-
ment. 
(46 FR 47971. Sept 30. 1981; 46 PR 54743. 
Nov. 4. 10813 
1447.252 State plan requirements. 
(a) The plan must provide that the 
requirements of this subpart are met. 
(b) The plan must specify compre-
hensively the methods and standards 
used by the agency to set payment 
rates in a manner consistent with 45 
CFR 201.2. 
(c) If the agency chooses to apply 
the cost limits established under Medi-
care (see 1405.460 of this chapter) on 
an individual provider basis, the plan 
must specify this requirement. 
(Approved by the Office of Management 
and Budget under control number 0938-
0193) 
(48 FR 56058. Dec. 19. 1983] 
BEFORE THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
In Re: WEBER MEMORIAL CARE 
CENTER, INC., AND CHARTHAM 
MANAGEMENT, INC., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
FINANCING, 
Respondent. 
PROPOSED DECISION, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
This matter was heard on oral argument. Having reviewed the 
transcripts of that argument, the exhibits admitted into evidence (including 
depositions taken herein), the written Final Arguments of the parties, the 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by counsel, and 
applicable law, the hearing officer now submits the following Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Proposed Decision to the executive director 
of the Department of Health in accordance with Rule 9 of the Administrative 
Hearing Procedures. 
SUMMARY OF ISSUES 
The Plaintiffs contend that the Utah State"Plan for payment to 
Medicaid providers is defective because of the following: 
(1) The flat rate system was predetermined by the budget 
appropriated by the legislature of the State of Utah in 1981. 
(2) No standards were set by the State of Utah relating to 
efficient or economically operated facilities. 
(3) No "assurances" could be made to the Secretary of 
-4-
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HHS without appropriate findings being first made by 
the State of Utah in accordance with 42 C.F.R. § 447.252(c) 
and 447.255. 
(4) The implementation of Utah of its definition of aT 
"skilled" patient for purposes of Medicaid reimbursement is 
incorrect as to thirty-eight patients, at least, at the Weber 
Memorial Care Center, and suggestive of arbitrary and capricious 
State conduct. 
Plaintiffs also defined the following issues: 
1. Because the State of Utah has chosen to carve out an exception 
in the method of payment for services for the State Training School in 
American Fork, all providers should be afforded the opportunity to qualify 
for such an exception if good reasons exist for different treatment. 
2. That Michael Stapley, acting director of the Utah State 
Department of Health is acting under color of state law and by so doing 
has violated 42 USC 1983 and 1988. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff, Weber Memorial Care Center Inc., is an 
Oregon corporation with its principal place of business in Roy, Utah, 
and is engaged in the principal business of providing longterm healthcare 
to the agedt 
2. The Plaintiff, Chartham Management, Inc., is an Oregon 
corporation which provides management services to Weber Memorial Care 
Center, Inc. 
3. The Respondent, the State of Utah, Department of Health, 
is the single state agency responsible for administering the Title XIX 
Medical Assistance Program within the state of Utah. Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act, as amended, is generally known as "Medicaid" and 
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establishes and governs the program for medical assistance to the indigent 
and developmentally disabled through the means of a cooperative effort 
between each of the participating states and the United States 6f America. 
The programs thus established are known generically as medical assistance 
programs. 
4. Prior to 1981, the State of Utah reimbursed longterm healthcare 
facilities participating in the Medicaid program on a cost-related reimbursement 
schedule. Essentially, facilities would report their costs to the State 
of Utah, and, depending upon the state-determined propriety and necessity 
of those costs, they would be reimbursed in whole or in part. This was 
pursuant to the then current Utah state plan which had been approved by 
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. 
5. Section 961 of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980 
(P.L. 96-499) deleted the medicaid requirement that skilled nursing 
facility and intermediate care facility services, be reimbursed on a 
reasonable cost related basis under standards and methods developed by 
the state and approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), 
and in its place, effective October 1980, the law required that states 
pay for these services on the basis of rates which the state finds, and 
makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary of HHS, are reasonable and 
adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and 
economically operated facilities in order to provide care in conformity 
with applicable state and federal laws, regulations and quality and safety 
standards. This language is now codified at 42 U.S.C. 61396 (a) (13) (A) 
and 42 C.F.R. §447.252 and colloqually referred to as the "Boren Amendment." 
-6-
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6, Thereafter, the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services published regulations to implement said amendment, which 
regulations are found at 42 C.F.R.Part 447 and are incorporated*herein 
by reference. 
7. The Senate Report accompanying the new langugage stated: 
The committee continues to believe that states should 
have flexibility in developing methods of payment for 
their medicaid programs and that application of the reasonable 
cost reimbursement principles of the medicare program for 
longterm care facility services is not entirely satisfactory. 
These principles are inherently inflationary and contain no 
incentives for efficient performance. 
The committee bill deletes the present language . . . 
and substitutes language which gives the States flexibility 
and discretion, subject to the statutory requirements of 
this section, to formulate their own methods and standards 
of payment. 
Senate Report No. 96-471, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted 
in 4 Medicare and Medicaid Guide Paragraph 24,407, at 8780-81 
(CCH) (1981). 
8. By letter, dated January 29, 1981, the Utah Health Care 
Association, which represents nearly all the nursing homes in the State 
of Utah, urged the State Legislature to endorse adoption of a system of 
payment to nursing homes furnishing long term care to medicaid patients, 
and defined the system as a "Modified Flat Rate" system. The letter 
represented that the system would return operating control to the owner 
or administrator, would relate to the cost of efficient operation, and 
would meet the requirements of State and Federal regulations pertaining 
to the medicaid program, and further that the system would be administra-
tively less costly, and would virtually eliminate the potential for fraud 
or abuse of the system. The letter further represented the system had 
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been discussed with and approved by the State Department of Health, and 
asked for representation on an ad hoc committee to review and assist in 
the final development and approval of the specific elements of ffuch a 
program. The letter then recommended a reduction in the nursing home 
budget for FY 1982 in the amount of 1.4 million dollars. 
9. The State Legislature on January 30, 1981 directed the 
Department of Health to work with provider organizations in developing 
such a system, and a committee was formed, known as the "Modified Flat 
Rate Committee," and instructed to develop and ready the system for 
implementation by July 1, 1981. The committee consisted of a representative 
from the legislature, a legislative analyst, the Executive Director of 
the Department of Health, a medicaid reimbursement specialist, the Executive 
Director of Utah Health Care Association, the President of the Utah 
Health Care Association, and a representative of the industry (a nursing 
home operator, not a member of the Health Care Association). 
10. The Modified Flat Rate Committee, hereinafter referred to 
as the Committee, assisted by staff members of the Department of Health 
and members of the health care industry, developed a system for payment 
of a fee for services to providers, which system has become known as the 
"modified flat rate" system and is often referred to as the "flat rate" 
system. 
11. Pursuant to said system, patients who qualify for Medicaid 
assistance are classed according to the degree of care needed, the potential 
for rehabilitation, whether they are mentally retarded, etc. The nursing 
homes that render such services are to be paid a "flat rate" fee per 
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patient per day according to the classification of such patient. The 
flat rate to be paid for patients within each classification is the same 
statewide. 
12. The flat rate derived for each class of patient was based 
on the most recent information on the actual costs being incurred by the 
nursing home industry in the aggregate, as reported by each facility on 
its 1980 "facility cost profile" (FCP); on comparison with the rates that 
other states were paying for nursing home services in Federal Region 8; 
on input from the Utah Health Care Association; on a trending factor on 
the historical costs as recommended by Lewin and Associates, a consulting 
firm that was retained by the State; on comparison with 1976 rates as 
inflated forward; on the legislative budget allocation; 
and on discussions and interactions on the Committee. The budget alloca-
tion itself was based on costs for prior years, projected forward. 
13. The flat rate thus derived is inflated annually on the 
basis of the Consumer Price Index for urban areas less mortgage interest 
cost and is renegotiated with the industry annually. 
14. Much of the discussion of the Committee centered around 
the treatment of property costs because there are significant differences 
in those costs between facilities and because of the opportunities to 
abuse the system through real estate transactions. In the letter mentioned 
in paragraph 8 above, the Utah Health Care Association said the modified 
flat rate system would "eliminate the incentive to engage in real estate 
transactions for profit on sale or lease of facilities." Two dollars per 
patient per day was added to the flat rate as partial compensation for 
historical property costs and return on equity. That amount is inflated 
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annually with the flat rate to cover increases in property tax, insurance, 
maintenance and contingencies. In addition to the flat rate, feach facility 
also receives a "property differential" as additional compensation for 
property costs, which is unique to each facility and approximates three-
fifths of the property costs as of March 27, 1981. Said property differential 
is not inflated. 
15. The Committee did not do a facility by facility analysis 
to determine whether each particular facility could be operated more 
economically or efficiently. 
16. Congressional intent expressed in the Senate committee's 
report states: 
Under the bill, (the) State would be free to establish 
rates on a statewide or other geographic basis, a class basis, 
or an institution-by-institution basis, without reference to 
medicare principles of reimbursement. 
(See citation in paragraph 7 above.) 
17. The "Modified Flat Rate" methodology of payment was 
properly taken through the rule making procedure, a public hearing was 
held and there were no objections from the industry. It was submitted 
to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, who certified that 
it satisfied the requirements of the law, and that all assurances submitted 
under the requirements of the act were acceptable. It was then adopted 
into law as an amendment to the state plan effective July 1, 1981. 
18. The State Plan does not contain a specific definition of 
what it means to be "efficiently and economically operated." Rather, 
the State has set rates for payment for services that the State deems are 
reasonable and adequate and maintains that an "efficiently and economically 
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operated facility" is one that is able to operate at or below that standard. 
Such approach is proper under current law, 
19. In explanations accompanying regulations of the Department 
of Health and Human Services, the Department states: 
We have also decided not to mandate that the State plan 
specifically provide a definition of an "efficiently 
and economically operated facility." The reason for this 
is that the State's methods and standards implicitly act 
as the State's definition of an efficiently and economically 
operated facility, and no explicit definition is necessary. 
Moreover, States are best equipped to determine what is an 
efficient and economically operated facility for its Medicaid 
program and a prescriptive Federal definition would be 
contrary to State flexibility. The term "efficiently 
and economically operated facility" is one that has not been 
precisely defined by the Congress, the Department or the 
health care industry. 
This decision is also consistent with our approach used for 
other key statutory terms such as disproportionate numbers 
of low income patients with special needs and reasonable 
and adequate payment rates in which we have not provided 
definitions. The use of a Federal definition would 
infringe on the discretion of the State. With regard to the 
latter term "reasonable and adequate" it should be noted that 
the term is not a precise number, but rather a rate which 
falls within a range of what could be considered reasonable 
and adequate. 
(See 42 C.F.R. Part 447 Federal Register Vol. 48 No. 244, 
Dec. 19, 1983 pp.56049). 
20. Because the "Modified Flat Rate" is applied uniformly 
statewide, and is the standard by which all nursing homes are measured, 
it was not necessary to examine the specific costs of Weber Memorial 
Care Center, Inc. to determine if it could be more efficiently and 
economically operated and that was not done. 
21. Over ninety percent of the long term care facilities in 
Utah furnishing medicaid services are meeting their costs through the 
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Modified Flat Rate system. The vast majority of those facilities are 
showing a profit. 
22. At any given time there are several hundred vacant beds 
in long term care facilities throughout the State, though no showing 
was made as to the geographical location of such beds. 
23. Plaintiff Weber Memorial Care Center was organized and the 
facility purchased after the "Modified Flat Rate" methodology was in 
place and operating. 
24. The classifications of required level of care into which 
Medicaid patients are placed by the State of Utah include skilled, inter-
mediate and three classes of intermediate mentally retarded. 
25. In making a determination into which classification a 
particular patient should be placed, doctors and nurses at the Department 
of Health consider the recommendations of the patients attending physician, 
the recommendation of the nursing home where that patient will reside 
and detailed information supplied by the attending physician and the 
nursing home on forms provided by the Department of Health. The doctors 
and nurses at the Department of Health do not examine the patient themselves. 
26. The long term care facilities do not have a right to appeal 
the classification made by the Department of Health but may request a 
reconsideration of the classification, which is routinely honored. It 
was not clear from the evidence presented whether such a request was made 
for any of the thirty-eight patients that Plaintiffs contend are not 
properly classified. 
27. The patient and/or the patient's next of kin and/or guardian 
have the right to appeal the classification made by the Department of 
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Health. If such appeal is made the informal hearing is generally held at 
the facility where the patient resides. The record indicates that none 
of the thirty-eight patients that are claimed to be wrongly classified 
filed such an appeal. 
28. Within each class, some patients require more care than 
others. In setting the rate to be paid for patients in each class, the 
State derived an average rate based upon the costs of the various levels 
of care within that class. 
29. The Utah State Medicaid definition of skilled care is as 
follows: 
MEDICARE (TITLE XVIII)/MEDICAID (TITLE XIX) 
CRITERIA FOR SKILLED NURSING FACILITY 
The care required and received by the patient must meet the 
following criteria: 
1. A skilled service (at least one) 
a. Skilled nursing 
b. Skilled physical therapy 
c. Skilled speech therapy 
d. Skilled occupational therapist 
e. Skilled respiratory therapy 
f. Skilled management of an aggregate of unskilled services 
g. Skilled services required to maintain a patient's 
condition (to prevent deterioration). 
and 
2. On a daily basis 
a. Skilled nursing - 7 days a week 
b. Skilled physical therapy - 5 days per week by a 
licensed physical therapist 
c. Skilled speech therapy by a licensed speech therapist 
d. Skilled occupational therapy by a licensed 
occupational therapist 
e. Skilled respiratory therapy 
f. Combination of different services on different 
days may meet "daily" requirement. 
and 
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3, As a practical matter, the daily skilled services must be 
rendered in an impatient SNF setting. Certified for 
both Medicare (Title XVIII) and Medicaid (Title XIX). 
Said definition is essentially the same as the Title XVIII 
Medicare definition except that the Medicare requirements that skilled 
services must commence within 30 days of a hospital discharge is not a 
requirement, and that care must be related to a minimum acute hospital 
stay of three days is not a requirement. The Medicare age requirement 
also does not apply. 
30. There is insufficient evidence in the record to warrant 
a finding that any of the thirty-eight patients claimed to be improperly 
classified meet the requirements to be classified for skilled care. 
31. The State Training School is a unique facility that 
provides unique services and care. It is therefore proper that the State 
Training School be treated differently as to payment for services. The 
methodology for payment to the State Training School went through 
appropriate rulemaking procedures, is contained in the State plan, and was 
approved by the Federal Government. There is nothing in the record to 
support a finding that Plaintiffs provide unique services or would other-
wise qualify for exceptional treatment. 
32. There is nothing in the record to support a claim of a 
civil rights violation either by James Mason, former director of the 
Department of Health, or by defendant Michael Stapley, acting in his 
official capacity as acting director of the Department of Health. Michael 
Stapley played no role in the development or promulgation of the "Modified 
Flat Rate" methodology. He was appointed acting director after the 
"Modified Flat Rate" methodology was promulgated into law. 
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33. Plaintiffs have failed to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the "Modified Flat Rate Committee" or the Department of 
Health acted arbitrarily or capriciously in the development and 
promulgation of the "Modified Flat Rate" methodology of payment. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAN 
1. The "Modified Flat Rate" methodology of paying providers 
for furnishing long term care services to Medicaid patients in the State 
of Utah, and as set forth in the State Plan, complies with all provisions 
of Federal and State Law. 
2. Neither the "Modified Flat Rate Committee", nor the Depart-
ment of Health nor any other defendant herein acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or 
contrary to the law in the development, implementation, and/or operation 
of the "Modified Flat Rate" methodology of paying providers for services 
rendered to Medicaid patients. 
3. Defendants James Mason and Michael Stapley did not violate 
Plaintiffs' civil rights. 
4. Plaintiffs' petition must be dismissed. 
Dated this 2 0 ^ of May, 1985. 
Brian L. Farr, J.D. 
Hearing Officer 
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STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH NORMANH BANGERTER GOVERNO 
SUZANNE DANDOY M D M P H EXECUTIVE DIRECTO 
BEFORE THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
In Re: WEBER MEMORIAL CARE 
CENTER, INC., AND CHARTHAM 
MANAGEMENT, INC., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
FINANCING, 
Respondent. 
FINAL DETERMINATION 
Having reviewed the recommended findings of fact and 
conclusions of law of the duly appointed Administrative Hearing 
Officer in the above entitled matter, a copy of which is attached 
hereto and incorporated herein, and having found that they are 
supported by substantial evidence in the record, 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED: 
That the aforementioned recommended findings of fact and 
conclusions of law be, and hereby are, sustained, and that the 
Hearing Officer's recommended decision be, and hereby is, affirmed. 
An appeal from this final determination may be secured 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 26-23-2 (1953 and Supp. 1983) by 
filing a petition in the appropriate District Court of the State of 
Utah within 30 days after this final determination is 
OFFICE OF THE EXtCUf VE DIRECTOR 
31 BO STATE OFFICE BUILDING • P O BOX 45500 • SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84145 -0500 .1801*533 -6111 
AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER 
- 1 6 -
received. Failure to file such a petition within the 30-day time 
limit may constiture a waiver of any right to appeal this 
determination. 
DATED this */"& aay of June, 1985. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
SUZANNE>DANDOY, M.D., M.P.fi. 
Executive Director 
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IIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
County of Salt Lake - State of Utan 
FILE NO. f-RR-4?fifi 
, A 
TITLE: ( • PARTIES PRESENT) 
Tn r p - WFRFR MFMORIAI CARF fFNTFq, T N C . 
and CHARTHAM MANAGEMENT, INC. , 
P l a i n t i f f s / A p p e l l a n t s . 
vs< 
UTAH DFPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DIVISION OF 
COUNSEL: (• COUNSEL PRESENT) 
William Dowries, Jr. 
Donald W. Lojek 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Clark C. Graves 
HEALTH CARE FINANCING, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Attorney for Defendants 
CLERK 
REPORTER 
BAJLIFF 
HON PHTITP R. FTSHLFR 
DATE: 
JUOG 
The Cnurt having hparri argument of counsel, rpviewed the record and Memoranda on 
filp hprein, and hping fullv advised in the prpmisps, finds that the conduct of the 
State of Utah in establishing its modified flat rate plan of reimbursement for health 
care providers was reasonable and adequate. The Court finds that the State of 
Utah did not base its decision solely on budgetary constraints. Lastly, the Court 
dpterminps that the ripcision of thp Administrative law .ludgp was supported hv 
sufficient evidence. 
Judgment for the defendant. Defense counsel is to prepare formal Findings of 
Fact. Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in accord with this Decision. 
/s/ PL Up t^\Ui^ 
PHILIP'R. FISHLER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Copies mailed to: 
William Dnwnes. Jr. 
Donald W. Lojek, Esq. 
Clark C. Graves. Esq. 
-18- PAGE_! OF 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472) "•,Vr W GLH r^! S 0 ' ~:CF 
Attorney General S • • r. - - ' \ - . 
WILLIAM T. EVANS (1018) 
D i v i s i o n Chief 
CLARK C. GRAVES (4216) AUG 4 1986 
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General /, o /" 
Attorney for Defendant '"• '•<£>£'yrf'l\'•<*'•<- ^A- c~„n 
236 S t a t e Capitol ^v IJkJxLiljJu^cLi 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114 &<*-•/a.* 
Telephone: 533-7642 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COONTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In ret I B U MSTHTAF. CARS : 
C U R S , INC. and CHABTHAH 
MAKAcrarr, INC., FIUU. jouswrr 
* 
Plaintiffs/Appellants : 
i 
V fi * 
i C i v i l No. C-85-426 8 
UTAH DEPARTMEHT OF HEALTH, : 
DXVISIOH OF HEALTH CARE 
FIHANCIHG t 
i 
Defendants /Appel lees , t 
This case comes t o the D i s t r i c t Court from an 
Adminis trat ive Decis ion in favor of the agency. The 
Adminis trat ive Lav Juuge made e x t e n s i v e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and 
conc lus ions of—law f e l l o v i n g a -tarial-pit-the merits .- -The 
Execut ive Director of the Utah Health Department i s sued a f i n a l 
determinat ion c o n s i s t e n t with the Findings of Fact and 
Corel« ions of Law recommended Dy the Hearing Of f i cer , and hence, 
our review i s l i m i t e d t o a review of the record t o determine 
whether the f i n a l d e c i s i o n of the agency was "capr ic ious , or not 
supported Dy the ev idence ," UCA 26-23-2(3) (1953, as amended 
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supported by the evidence," OCA 26-23-2(3) (1953, as amended 
1981). The Court f inds that the Executive Director'• f inal 
determination-MAS supported by a residuum of l ega l ly admissible 
evidence in the record and was not arbitrary or capricious. 
Judgment, accordingly, for Defendant, the Utah Department of 
Health. 
DATED t h i s H day of 1_V OUJQA- . 1986. 
ffl'll i l l l f f ^ ' ^ - - ; JUDGE PRESIDING ~\ 
SOBMITTBD t h i s ^ v ^ > day of ^T/^^f 1986. 
r*»TTPTrATB OF MATT.TMf; 
I hereby cert i fy that I mailed a true and exact copy of 
the foregoing Proposed Findings of Pact and Conclusions of Law, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Donald W. Lojek 
LOJEK fc PENLAND 
Attorneys for Weber Memorial 
Care Center 
P.O. Box 199 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
William Downss, Jr . 
419 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
_oa t h i s «*« ~2ffSri«Y of w 5 s ^ e -
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M .^ BO. ^  ,« THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
County of Salt Lake - State of Utah 
Type of h—ring. Oiv Annul Supp. Order OSC Other. 
rtt: PKf , Deft Summons Stipulation 
P Atty: £tm*jLd. U). ^H^tJ^y Waiver Publication! 
^ww... * Examined: ~ — -rf'^yyf——- • T X - - « 
Pltf: Deft: Judge: V .f^/JLUf £ O ^ A A v 
Others: Clerk: S . 
D. Atty: CJiA^iu 6 . 4 & U c O & / D Defaujf of Pltf/De* Entered 
S orn & i : Date " ~ " 
) i*  l f/ eft  
% tZiiVL Reporter: Bailiff: r1? rV ftyJfr,YY/V^ 
ORDERS: 
D Custody Evaluation Ordered D Custody Awarded To 
D VieitalionRfgfts 
• PW/D-* Awarded Support $ x « Per Month 
D PW/Deft Awatfed Alimony $ Per Month/Year D Alimony Waived 
D Payments to be made through the Berks Office: 
D Atty. fees to the in the amount of D Deferred 
• Home To:
 m 
U Furnishings To: Automobile To: 
G Each Party Awarded their Personal Property 
I / Pitt/Deft, to Maintain Debts and Obligations 
, Pltf/Deft, to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children 
[ : Restraining Order Entered Against. 
Li Pltf/Dett. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $ 
D 90-Day Waiting Period is Waived 
H Divorce Granted To As 
D Decree To Become Final: L i 'pof^Entry D 3-Month Interlocutory 
D Former Name of .
 mmmm - Is Rsstopsd 
D -Baaed on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of Pttfs counsel, court 
orders / shall issue for Deft 
Returnable Bail 
U Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, 
muri 'ers the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
L ' Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Raintiff's counsel, court orders 
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EXCERPTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF FORMAL HEARING 
HEARING HELD AUGUST 3, 1984 BEFORE 
BRIAN L. FARR, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
Vol, 1. p.9. 1.14 through p.11. 1.7 
MR. LOJEK: We would like to raise one additional issue of 
which I believe you have already ruled. I would like the record 
to be clear on this. We would like to present evidence here 
this morning of the costs incurred, the specific costs incurred 
by Weber Memorial Care Center in each and every cost category 
over the past three years. The reason we would like to do that 
is to be able to demonstrate to the hearing officer that the 
Weber Memorial Care Center is that kind of an efficiently and 
economically operated provider, which is contemplated by the 
federal statute and federal rules which I have just mentioned. 
MR. QUIGLEY; Your Honor, I don't mean to interrupt. 
That's an issue that has already been settled now and we 
did not come to this hearing to listen to the costs of this 
facility. We went into it. We briefed it to you. You've 
written your opinion on it. I think we ought to leave it 
right there. 
THE HEARING OFFICER: I will let you finish your 
remarks, then I'll rule on that. Are you finished? 
MR. LOJEK: I'll wait for a ruling on the interrup-
tion. 
THE HEARING OFFICER: Because of that prior ruling, I 
would rule that it's not appropriate to take evidence on 
at this time. I suppose that if you are not satisfied with 
the ruling of this hearing, that you will end up appealing, 
and that's the time to consider whether that evidence ought 
to be heard. 
MR. LOJEK: 1 wonder if you might take evidence on 
this issue, then recommend to Mr. Stapley, who receives 
your recommendation, you might recommend to him not to 
review that evidenc. So if he chose to ignore your recom-
mendation, he could, then have the evidence to review. 
MR. QUIGLEY: We thoroughly briefed on this, received 
your decision on it. 1 didn't come here this morning at 
all to discuss the costs of this facility. You ruled that 
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the costs of the facility are immaterial to the hearing. 
So there will be no purpose served by having them demon-
strate what all their costs are. They may be reasonable, I 
don't know, under certain definitions* They simply donft 
meet the standards set by the Statef which is the flat 
rate. I think your ruling is very clear on that. 
THE HEARING OFFICER: We111 let the former ruling 
stand. 
MR. LOJEK: Can my objection be noted for the record? 
THE HEARING OFFICER: Yes. 
Vol, II, P.223, 1.4 through P.224, 1.8. 
Mr. Lojek continuing to question Mr. Brocksome. 
Q. (by Mr. Lojek) Moving along to another area, Mr. 
Brocksome, the Hearing Officer in this case has ruled that 
we cannot go into specific costs at Weber Memorial in order 
to demonstrate whether you are or not an efficiently and 
economically operated facility. 
This is in the nature of an offer of proof and only 
one question, Mr. Farr. 
But if we were permitted to go into this area, Mr. 
Brocksome, would you be able to show to the Hearing Offic-
er's satisfaction that the costs at Weber Memorial Care 
Center are reflective of an efficient and economical opera-
tion? 
A. Yes. 
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Vol, III, P. 492, 1.10 through P.495. 1.2 
Cross examination by Ms. Jenson of Mr. Elliott. 
Q. Are you unaware of any of these benefits or the 
financial arrangements of your own facility? 
MR. LOJEK: I'm going to object. I'm not sure Mr. 
Elliott did that, testified that his particular facility is 
efficiently an economically operated. I think because of 
the ruling of the Hearing Officer, we were specifically 
precluded from going into that area, could not demonstrate 
our costs as we wished to do so and as we disclosed in our 
brief to the Hearing Officer we would do. Therefore, it is 
difficult to offer that evidence without anything to back 
it up. 
MS. JENSON: Your Honor, I think that he did testify 
to factors such as medical supplies, the climate, the mil 
levy, the age of the facility about the efficiency of his 
facility. 
THE WITNESS: I was referring to all facilities. 
MS. JENSON: In theory. 
THE WITNESS: As far as responding to your last ques-
tion on economy and efficiency and the reason that if 
facilities -- that it costs more to take care of a patient 
may be more economic and efficient than one that costs 
less. I can use Weber as an example. 
Q. (by Ms. Jenson) You could use Weber as an exam-
ple. You are unfamiliar with the financial arrangement of 
your particular facility. 
A. I don't know what that means. You didn't discuss 
anything that relates to the financials that I have to be 
aware of to operate on a daily basis. And --
Q: Isn't it true that part of the cost of operating 
on a daily basis are your property costs and your tax costs? 
MR. LOJEK: I'm going to object to that question. The 
reason, again, is that she's trying to dissect the costs in 
order to show somehow we are inefficiently an uneconomical-
ly operated. 
MS. JENSON: Your Honor, I'm not. 
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MR. LOJEK: Thatfs fair if that's an issue in this 
hearing. But since the ruling of the Hearing Officer, that 
has been removed as an issue from the hearing, and we 
haven't offered any evidence on it. If the Hearing Officer 
choses [sic]f we will come in with a lot of exhibits and go 
through all of the costs and prove we are efficiently and 
economically operated. 
THE HEARING OFFICER: Your objection is sustained. I 
think that's something you can argue anyway. 
MS. JENSON: Well, except if I may respond to the 
objection. I am not pursuing the costs. In fact, I didn't 
ask him how much things are being appreciated. I attempted 
to establish that this particular witness is not qualified. 
I want to impeach his opinion of his ability to assess 
whether facilities are economically and efficiently operat-
ed. One of the factors of efficiently and economically 
operated is the ability to assess property costs and to 
understand tax rights and things like that. I think that 
my line of questioning goes to his ability to assess wheth-
er facilities are efficiently and economically operated. 
MR. LOJEK: I think counsel has misconstrued the rea-
sons for which he offered his previous testimony. It is 
not to prove any facility, specific facility, is economi-
cally and efficiently operated. It is to show simply if 
one were to attempt to find out if a Riven facility is eco-
nomically and efficiently operated, or, indeed, if TFTe 
whole system would respond to those which are efficiently 
and economically operated, then one must take into consid-
eration the factors that were enumerated by this witneTs". 
That's the only purpose of that testimony^ 
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Vol, IV, P. 590, 1.3 through P. 591, 1.2 
Ms. Jenson questioning Don R. Bybee. 
MR. LOJEK: I'm going to object to the question 
because it's the same repetitive pattern again. I think 
the implication i8 being made here that Mr. Bybee and his 
company are not reasonable cost conscious prudent managers, 
are simply engaged in an interlocking scheme to not cut 
costs so costs are highter, that indeed is why they're not 
not being able to exist under the flat rate system. Well, 
that's not the case. So I think the implication is being 
made. Everything would be fine and Weber Memorial Care 
Center --
MS, JENSON: Your Honor, is this an objection or an 
argument? Excuse me. 
MR. LOJEK: Excuse me. If that't the case that's 
being made by the State of Utah, that's fine. We're prepar-
ed to fully and frankly disclose each and every cost of 
Weber Memorial Care Center to justify those costs, to 
explain how they're arrived at, to allow Madame to conduct 
her cross-examination as she will. We don't have any prob-
lem with that. We feel we are being hamstrung by the Hear-
ing Officer's previous ruling that costs will not be allow-
ed to be examined in this case on one hand. And on the 
other hand, they have this implication drawn by this pre-
sent line of questioning. I think, based on the Hearing 
Officer's previous ruling, this line of questioning is 
irrelevant, and I would make my objection and ask the Hear-
ing Officer to instruct counsel to move to another area. 
Vol. IV, P. 617, 1.18-24. 
Ms. Jenson continuing to question Mr. Bybee. 
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MS. JENSON: I think we1re getting into costs. I think 
Mr. Bybee has already testified that he thought this was a 
good price, that the basis on which he felt that, the 
interest rate and the appraisal. I think anymore would be 
getting into costs of the facility. 
MR. LOJEK: I think we're done with that testimony 
anyway. 
Vol. IV, P.629, 1.1 through P. 630, 1.9 
Mr. Lojek questioning Mr. Bybee. 
Q. Mr. Bybee, did you ever do a comparison of the 
costs of other chain providers who are provided with man-
agement services to their nursing home facilities? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. How does Chartham Management compare with these 
other chain providers? 
A. The other providers run approximately $2.75 to $3 
per patient day to 6 to 7 percent of revenue as a general 
statement. There are some exceptions. That's generally 
true. 
Our costs are running atout $1.45, $1.47 per 
patient day, about half. But then when you move In the 
allocation of various personnel to get the true costs, 
we1 re still under other management fees charged by other 
chains and other organizations, other private Individual 
operators. So we're under them. We're more competitive. 
Q. Are you prepared to testify today as to those first 
steps that the Weber Memorial Care Center has taken over 
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the years in order to cut costs as far as practical and 
possible? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you prepared to testify here today concerning 
your experience with the State of Utah officials which led 
to the filing of this appeal? 
A, Yes. 
Q. Are you prepared to testify here today as to your 
opinion as to whether the Weber Memorial Care Center is 
being reimbursed at a level sufficient to meet the costs of 
an efficiently and economically-operated facility? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you were permitted to so testify, would you? 
A. Yes. 
Vol. 1, P. 88, 1.3 through P.94, 1.12 
Q (by Ms. Jensen) Are those facilities making a pro-
fit under the modified flat rate? 
MR. LOJEK: Mr. Farrf since the State made an objec-
tion, we can't go into our costs or any declaration of our 
costs or whether efficient or non-efficient. It seems to me 
the State is now waiving its objection. I'm not going to 
object to this line of questioning at all. I'm going to 
come back and go into our costs in great detail and attempt 
to show the hearing officer that, indeed, our costs are 
quite efficient and quite economical, cannot be improved 
upon. I just want the hearing officer to be aware and per-
haps give some direction to the State of Utah as to why I'm 
not objecting to this. 
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MS. JENSEN: If I nay speak to that objection: This 
morning we spent more than an hour going into the use of 
the modified flat rate as a methodology to distinguishing 
those profitable efficient and economic providers from 
those which were not profitable, therefore, not efficiently 
and economically operated. 
Also, Mr. Dunn was asked, if you will recall, by Mr. 
Lojek, whether there were any factors which Roy felt came 
to bear on the fact that Weber Memorial was not making a 
profit. We don't want to go into the costs of Weber Memor-
ial. Indeed, under your earlier ruling, we will not go in-
to those costs. . . 
MR. LOJEK: I would add to my objection, Mr. Farr, to 
the idea with which counsel appears to be obsessed for the 
last nine months, profitability is somehow an issue in this 
hearing. Profit has nothing to do whatsoever with the flat 
rate system or of this particular facility. We are not in 
this room--we have not brought this appeal to seek a 
profit. We don't care about a profit. We are willing to 
forego a profit. We are petitioning in a profitless 
system. The point is, we're supposed to achieve our costs 
up to the parity of costs but not beyond. So any questions 
or allusions, allegations to profit are beside the point. 
I objected to this before and the State knows our position 
on this very, very clearly. 
1 think it's appropriate to go into costs. I think we 
should examine all of our costs. I think that we should 
stay here until next week and go through each and every 
cost of Weber Memorial Care Center and have these erudite 
ladies and gentlemen from the State of Utah point out to 
this provider why those costs are inefficient and 
uneconomical, how they could cut out some of these costs. 
I would love to be able to do that. This hearing officer 
has ruled we are not permitted to do that. The State made 
its motion and objected to our proceeding along those 
lines. . • 
MR. LOJEK: In one sentence, I would object to that if 
we're not permitted to prove up our costs in terms of effi-
ciency and economy by epxert testimony from a lot of people 
who run nrusing homes on a day-to-day basis and who don't 
sit in governmental chairs to pass judgment on things which 
they haven't defined. 
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MS. JENSONt Your Honor, we do not want to go Into 
Weber Memorial's costs. We want to compare them with those 
facilities, the 79 to 90 percent for whom the flat rate 
does meet their costs and, Indeed, provides them some 
profit. 
THE HEARING OFFICERi You may proceed, but be careful 
not to get Into the cost Issue. 1 will go a little further 
to say with the direction you are heading in this question-
ing, I may come back and rule on his motion differently. 
Vol. 1, P. 97, 1.10-21. 
THE HEARING OFFICER: Let's just take a minute and go back 
and restate what the issues are that are being considered 
by that prior ruling. We did decide it would be necessary 
to discuss whether Weber was an efficiently and economical-
ly operated facility. That question has been ruled on. So 
the issues that are before us have to do with whether the 
State plan was adopted by some reasonably principled means 
or whether it was just determined by the budget and then 
those exceptions relating to the State Training School and 
the definition of skilled and unskilled so I think the 
questions ought to go to how the plan was adopted and what 
you know. 
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Vol. 1, P.143. 1-20 through P. 145, 1.12, 
Questioning by Ms. Jenson to Roy Dunn 
Q. So that you testified earlier that Mr. Bybee was 
aware of the effect of the modified flat rate when he pur* 
chased the facility. Does this letter support that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you aware what any other bidders may have bid 
as a purchase price to Weber Memorial based on their calcu-
lation of what would meet their costs under the modified 
flat rate? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What were those bids and from whom? 
MR. LOJEK: I'm going to object again to ths area of 
inquiry. What counsel is attempting to do, Mr. Farr, is to 
indicate that the Appellant here is improvident or an 
uneconomical or inefficient provider, and is not a bad 
defense, particularly if you are going to have to defend 
the State. 
Since we have not been permitted to go into it •• 
since we are not permitted to go into this area and prove 
up our costs as to why, indeed, they are efficient and 
economical and in all respects, I don't think that counsel 
can go ahead and introduce that kind of an answer, ask 
those kinds of questions. I would object to them. She's 
attempting to show opposite what we would like to show. We 
cannot because of your previous ruling. I'm not quarreling 
too much. I have made my objection. It does seem to be 
radically unfair to allow her to do what we cannot. That's 
the reason for my objection. 
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Vol. II, P. 209, 1,7 through P.211, 1.21 
Mr. Lojek questioning Mr. Brocksome. 
Q. Now, if Weber Memorial wanted to save money 
ehouldnft they fire Chartham and just do their accounting 
internally? Wouldnft it be more cost efficient to them? 
A. Well, it was •- No. Prior to the acquisition of 
our facility, they were running 75- to $90,000 per month in 
the red. So --
MS. JENSON: I object to this testimony. I object. I 
think that we, yesterday, we did go into some factors that 
when you compare Weber Memorial to other facilities operat-
ing under the flat rate may have affected its efficiency. 
I think that we're getting much more deeply into costs and 
actually costs of the facility, which we have agreed we 
would not get into. . . 
THE HEARING OFFICER: How many more questions do you 
think you need to pose along that line? 
Q. Could you just explain what facets, what you do to 
facilitate in accounting. 
A. We provide the mechanism and vehicle for all of 
the financials on a monthly basis to be provided to include 
profit/loss detail, of course, balance sheet as well as 
payroll. We recently purchased a stand-alone data 
processing system, which will lower the overall cost to all 
of our facilities. 
MS. JENSON: I object. I don't think we need to get 
into costs. If you want to explain what you do as in terms 
of an accountant, that's fine. 
MR. LOJEK: I think that's what he's trying to do. 
MS. JENSON: No. He's trying to demonstrate how 
Chartham and Weber Memorial and all of its other facilities 
have cut their costs, which has no relevance, which we have 
agreed not to get into. 
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Vol, 1, P.34. 1.22 through P.35. 1.22 
Q. (by Mr. Lojek) 1 would like you to tell the hearing 
officer of any data, any findings, any study you have ever 
made, by ••you" I mean in aggregate the Department of 
Health, indicating rates being paid to Weber Memorial Care 
Center are reasonable and adequate to reimburse an 
efficiently and economically operated provider within the 
meaning of the definition found at 42 C.F.R. Section 
447.252. 
A, (Mr. Dunn) That's where I'm getting confused. 
MR. QUIGLEYc May I interrupt just a moment. 
THE HEARING OFFICER: Let me make a statement, Mr. 
Lojek. I think I understand what you are driving at, and I 
know what the testimony is, that the State has not taken 
Weber county and examined all of their reports and decided 
whether they are economically and efficiently operated. 
But that data has been taken into account in setting the 
flat rate. So I think we're in agreement. We don't need 
further testimony on that. Is that sufficient for you? 
MR. LOJEK: In part. 
THE HEARING OFFICER: What more do you need? 
MR. LOJEK: I would like Mr. Dunn to advise the hear-
ing officer as to whether the State of Utah has ever adopt-
ed any criteria, rules, regulations or standards indicating 
which providers are efficiently and economically operated, 
which are not. 
Vol. 1, P. 58. 1.15 through P. 59. 1.2 
Q. We have had a previous ruling from the hearing 
officer that we cannot go into individual costs of the pro-
vider. And I don't intend to do that. But can you tell me 
as we sit here now, any way in which the Weber Memorial 
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Care Center could be made more efficient and more econo-
mic? 
MR. QUIGLEYt I don't know what counsel means by effi-
cient and economic. Could he define it for us. 
MR. LOJEK: We don't either, Mr. Quigley. That seems 
to be the point here. The State of Utah has never defined 
those terms. 
MR. QUIGLEYi We defined it by the flat rate. 
MR. LOJEK: I guess you understand. 
Testimony of Roy Dunn 
Vol. 1, p.31, 1.8 through p.32, 1.1. 
Q. (by Mr. Lojek) Assuming that you did receive 
such a cost report was that cost report exmined by the 
State of Utah in order to determine whether the rate estab-
lished for the Weber Memorial Care Center was reasonable 
and adequate to meet the costs that must be incurred by 
efficiently and economically--
MR. QUIGLEY: I'm going to object to this line of 
questioning. We're right back to the same thing that we 
briefed and had given to you before* We do not pay the 
reasonable costs of a facility of a provider. We do not 
pay reasonable costs. We pay rates. And that rate is 
established industrywide. He keeps referring "Did we 
examine this particular facility.'1 The simple answer is, 
"No, we don't examine the costs of a facility." And that's 
been answered many times. 
-34-
